. This research consistently has demonstrated that shared information (i.e., information held by all group members) tends to be pooled in discussion more than unshared information (i.e., information held by only one group member). Overall, past research has indicated that shared information tends to have a greater influence on group decision making than does unshared information.
An overreliance on shared information is problematic for groups when shared information favors a suboptimal decision alternative but the information as a whole favors the best decision alternative. Under these circumstances, relying on shared information at the expense of unshared information could lead to faulty decision making. The negative influence over reliance on shared information can have on decision making is clearly demonstrated in research using hidden profiles (Stasser, 1988) . In a hidden profile, the information held by each individual group member favors a suboptimal decision alternative. However, the total information held by all group members favors a better decision. If group members pool all of the unshared information, the best alternative should become apparent.
Unfortunately, groups with hidden profiles select the suboptimal decision alternative more frequently than they select the best decision alternative. In contrast, groups in which all information is initially shared select the best alternative more than hidden profile groups (e.g., Cruz et al., 1997; Hollingshead, 1996b; Kelly & Karau, 1999; Stasser & Titus, 1985) . Stasser and Titus (1985) showed that group discussion decreased the percentage of group members making optimal decisions under hidden profile conditions. This indicates that social influence occurs in decision-making groups dealing with hidden profiles. In the present study, we will examine how social influence works under different information profiles.
SOURCES OF INFLUENCE
Researchers have identified two types of social influence in decision-making contexts (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kaplan & Miller, 1987) . Normative influence occurs when individuals make decisions to gain approval from other group members. Informational influence, on the other hand, occurs when individuals make decisions to reach the best possible decision.
Based on these definitions, normative influence occurs in groups when discussion content presents the positions favored by other group members (Kaplan & Miller, 1987) . If normative influence is effective, change their positions to the position favored by the majority in order to fit in with the group. In contrast, informational influence should occur when facts, evidence, or other forms of information pertinent to the decision are discussed by group members and cause them to reevaluate their positions (Kaplan & Miller, 1987) . Researchers have operationalized normative influence as the statements in discussion that indicate the positions supported by other group members. Informational influence has been operationalized as statements revealing relevant facts or evidence (e.g., Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Kelly, Jackson, & Hutson-Comeaux, 1997) . In any decision-making group, both normative and informational influence can occur. Next we examine how normative and informational influence may occur in hidden profiles.
SOURCES OF NORMATIVE INFLUENCE
In the context of hidden profiles, the initial starting positions adopted by group members represents a possible source of normative influence. Statements that indicate the position favored by a majority of group members should provide normative pressure on other group members to shift toward that position. Numerous studies have indicated that prediscussion positions favored by the majority or a plurality have a strong influence on group decisions (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Kameda et al., 1997; Larson et al., 1994; Stasser & Titus, 1985 Winquist & Larson, 1998) . Based on previous research, we argue that normative influence will be strongest when a clear consensus exists among group members.
We argue that normative influence will be stronger in consensus groups than in groups without initial consensus. In essence, when there is an initial consensus, group members should face strong normative pressure to maintain the group harmony by not disagreeing with the clear group preference. Very little group discussion may be necessary for group members to feel this normative pressure. Evidence of normative pressure in groups with initial consensus is evidenced by the fact that such groups are less likely to change to the position most favored by the information (e.g., Hollingshead, 1996b) . In addition to the prevalence of normative influence in hidden profiles, informational influence should also occur when group members rely on decision-relevant information. In the next section, we examine informational influence in hidden profiles.
SOURCES OF INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE
Unshared information raised during discussion is a clear source of informational influence. Unshared information represents new facts or evidence for most of the group members that may be relevant to the group decision. If the information is deemed accurate and relevant, it has the potential to cause group members to reevaluate their positions to account for the new information. A variety of studies have found that the presence of unshared information in the group discussion can increase group decision-making accuracy (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Kelly et al., 1997; Winquist & Larson, 1998) .
In addition to unshared information, shared information in discussion should also exert informational influence. Mayer, Sonoda, 394 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / August 2003 and Gudykunst (1997) found that groups with more decision-relevant information made better decisions than groups with less information in a context where all information was shared. This indicates that, like unshared information, shared information can serve as a source of informational influence. Consistent with past operationalizations of informational influence (e.g., Kaplan & Miller, 1987) , raising an item of shared information in discussion creates the potential for informational influence. When information is shared prior to discussion, it can be incorporated into each group member's prediscussion decision preferences (Winquist & Larson, 1998) . However, when a shared item is mentioned or repeated by another group member, that item has the potential to take on greater weight in the decision-making process. When a group member mentions an item of shared information, it can verify for the other group members that they accurately recalled that item. Furthermore, it can indicate that other members also consider that item important and relevant to the decision-making process (see Wittenbaum et al., 1999) . This verification process may increase the weight that group members assign to shared items of information and cause the members to readjust their preferences accordingly.
Evidence of shared information serving as a source of informational influence is available in several studies. Recall that Stasser and Titus (1985) found that discussion decreased the percentage of correct decisions among group members in hidden profile conditions. They also found that group members recalled more shared than unshared information after discussion when dealing with hidden profiles, indicating a preference for shared information in discussion. Larson, Christensen, et al. (1998) found that repetition of shared information during discussion increased bias in decisions. These studies indicate that the discussion of shared information may have had an influence above and beyond the information's impact on group members' initial preferences.
We have discussed how shared starting positions can create normative pressure in decision-making groups and how discussion of shared and unshared information can create informational pressure. In the next section, we will consider how sources of normative and informational influence are confounded in hidden profiles.
A CONFOUND IN HIDDEN PROFILES
In hidden profiles, the initial starting positions adopted by group members and the information shared by group members are confounded. Each individual starts out with more shared than unshared information. Shared and unshared information support different decision alternatives, with shared information always favoring a suboptimal decision alternative. Thus, both shared information and the balance of prediscussion information support the inferior decision alternative. This sets up a situation in which it is difficult to distinguish the impact of shared information from the impact of initial starting positions.
In addition, both informational and normative sources of influence favor the inferior decision alternative in hidden profiles, whereas only the potential informational influence in the form of unshared information favors the best alternative. In this study, we attempt to extend hidden profile research by examining situations in which the confound between shared information and initial starting positions are reduced and reversed. We propose to do this while maintaining a key aspect of hidden profiles. Specifically, in this study, overall shared information and unshared information always favor different alternatives.
In contrast to a hidden profile, an ambiguous profile is created when information distribution does not create an initial preference for either the best or the suboptimal decision alternative. In an ambiguous profile, each group member starts with the same number of items favoring high-and low-quality decision alternatives. The balance of shared information favors the less desirable decision alternative, and the balance of unshared information favors the more desirable decision alternative. Therefore, in an ambiguous profile, initial starting positions should be no more likely to favor the position supported by shared information than the position supported by unshared information.
In a clear profile, the initial information distribution creates a preference for the superior decision alternative. Opposite to the classic hidden profile, in a clear profile, each group member starts with more information favoring the superior than the inferior decision alternative. Consistent with hidden and ambiguous profiles, 396 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / August 2003 the balance of shared information favors the inferior decision alternative and the balance of unshared information favors the superior decision alternative in clear profiles. In the next sections, we present our hypotheses concerning hidden, ambiguous, and clear profiles.
GROUP DECISION HYPOTHESIS
In conjunction with past research, we predict that under hidden profile conditions, groups will choose the inferior decision alternative more frequently than the superior decision alternative (e.g., Cruz et al., 1997; Hollingshead, 1996b; Stasser & Titus, 1985) . This reflects the fact that both initial starting positions and shared information favor the incorrect decision, whereas only unshared information favors the correct decision.
With ambiguous profiles, we anticipate that groups will be more likely to select the best decision alternative than under hidden profile conditions. Here, shared information favors the poor decision alternative and unshared information favors the best decision alternative. Initial starting position is neutral, thus reducing its potential to influence decisions one way or the other.
In clear profile conditions, unshared information and initial starting positions favor the best decision alternative. This reverses the bias created in hidden profile conditions. Under these circumstances, we would expect groups to make the correct decision more frequently than in the ambiguous or the hidden profile conditions.
Hypothesis 1: Groups with clear profiles will be more likely to select the best alternative than groups with ambiguous profiles; groups with ambiguous profiles will be more likely to select the best alternative than groups with hidden profiles.
NORMATIVE AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE HYPOTHESES
The stronger the initial preferences are for a given position, the more that initial starting positions will influence group decisions. There are many examples of research indicating that the initial starting positions of group members significantly predict group decisions (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Gruenfeld et al., 1996;  Henningsen, Henningsen / NORMATIVE AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE 397 Kameda et al., 1997; Stasser & Titus, 1985 . Social influence generated by the shared initial starting positions of group members should take the form of normative influence. The nature of hidden and clear profiles should lead groups to more prediscussion consensus than will occur in ambiguous profiles. Thus, we feel that normative influence will be more prevalent in hidden and clear profiles than in ambiguous profiles.
In contrast, when there is less initial support for a specific decision alternative, the use of normative influence should be reduced, creating an opportunity for group members to use informational influence. Some support for this contention is provided by research that shows increased use of information by decision-making groups with conflicting starting positions (Brodbeck et al., 2002; Propp, 1997 ; but see also Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Stasser & Titus, 1985) . Overall, we predict that groups will rely more on informational influence under ambiguous profiles than under clear or hidden profiles. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Group members will perceive more normative influence in hidden and clear profile conditions than in ambiguous profile conditions.
Hypothesis 3: Group members will perceive more informational influence in ambiguous profile conditions than in hidden and clear profile conditions.
Various studies have shown that shared information is discussed more than unshared information during group discussions of hidden profiles (e.g., Cruz et al., 1997; Hollingshead, 1996b; Savadori et al., 2001) . As noted previously, in hidden profiles, shared information and initial starting positions favor the suboptimal decision alternative. When a clear profile exists, the advantage of shared initial starting position should augment the position favored by unshared rather than shared information. Dennis (1996) found that groups were more likely to discuss information supporting their initial positions than information that was negative or neutral to that position (see also Schittekatte, 1996) . Kelly and Karau (1999) found that group members were more likely to discuss information that favored the best decision alternative if they initially preferred 398 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / August 2003 that alternative. These studies indicate that initial preferences tend to promote discussion of items supporting those preferences. In clear profiles, that should lead to increased discussion of the unshared information.
We have discussed how initial preferences lead to increased discussion of preference-consistent information. In addition, Boster and Mayer (1984) found that arguments presented supporting the majority position were considered to be stronger than arguments offered supporting the minority position. Initial preferences seem to add weight to shared information in hidden profile conditions but should augment unshared information in clear profile conditions. Thus, we propose our 4th hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Groups will favor shared information over unshared information in hidden profile conditions, will equally favor shared and unshared information under ambiguous profile conditions, and will favor unshared information over shared information in clear profile conditions. Finally, because we are interested in social influence, we want to determine whether perceptions of normative and informational influence are accurate predictors of actual social influence in groups. To that end, we propose to examine how group members' perceptions of normative and informational influence predict the actual social influence that occurs during group decision making. We propose the following hypothesis to examine this issue:
Hypothesis 5: Perceptions of normative and informational influence will be positive predictors of shifts in group members'decision preferences from pre-to postdiscussion.
METHOD PARTICIPANTS
One hundred eleven undergraduates at a large midwestern university (63 females, 43 males, 5 unreported) were randomly assigned Henningsen, Henningsen / NORMATIVE AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE 399 to three-person groups (N = 37) to take part in the study. Participants were volunteers who received extra course credit for their participation.
DESIGN
The design of the experiment was a three-group, one-way independent groups design with random assignment to experimental condition. The independent variable was the type of profile to which groups were assigned: hidden profile, ambiguous profile, or clear profile.
DECISION MATERIALS AND MEASURES
Decision materials from Cruz et al. (1997) were modified for use in this study. The materials included the descriptions of two job applicants for the position of assistant professor. Each description focused on 14 characteristics of each professor (the same characteristics for each). A criterion expressing the desired qualifications on each of 14 items for the job applicant also was provided. Each item of information either satisfied a criterion for a preferred candidate (i.e., supporting information) or failed to satisfy a criterion for the preferred candidate (i.e., opposing information). One additional item was added to the Cruz et al. materials to accommodate threeperson groups.
Each group member received both shared and unshared information representing a proportion of the total information about each candidate. For each condition, the balance of shared information favored the inferior decision alternative and the balance of unshared information favored the superior decision alternative. The information was distributed so that initial starting positions favored (a) the suboptimal alternative in the hidden profile condition, (b) neither the optimal nor the suboptimal alternative in the ambiguous profile condition, or (c) the optimal alternative in the clear profile condition.
The amount of shared information in the information sets varied slightly across conditions. We varied shared information so that we 400 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / August 2003 would not have to add items or subtract items to/from any of the conditions. In essence, to modify the number of unshared items of information distributed to each group member, a net change of three items of information was needed, whereas changing shared information allowed for a change of only one item. Shared items that were changed were randomly selected. The distribution of shared and unshared items supporting or opposing either candidate is presented in Table 1 .
To measure social influence, sixteen 7-point, Likert-type items, derived from Henningsen, Henningsen, Cruz, and Morrill (2002) , were used to measure perceived normative influence (e.g., "People used their opinions to change other people's minds," "My behavior was guided by a desire for group harmony") with α = .71. Sixteen 7-point, Likert-type items derived from Henningsen et al. were also used to assess perceived informational influence (e.g., "I thought the group members used information to sway my decisions," "People used their information to change other people's minds") with α = .72.
PROCEDURES
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to three-person groups and to one of the three experimental conditions. Individuals were seated separately and were each provided with a packet of information. The packet described a hypothetical job search in which the participants were instructed to role-play the part of a member of the search committee. A list of 14 criteria was explained in the packet. In addition, each person received a description of two job candidates, including information about how each candidate fit some of the 14 established criteria for the position. Each group member received five items about each candidate that was shared with all other group members and three items that were held uniquely in the member's group. After reading the information contained in the packet, each group member individually recorded his or her initial decision preference. Individuals were then seated with their group members and instructed to discuss the decision task until they arrived at a consensus decision.
Following recording of the group decision, group members were asked to list the items of information they felt were most important to the decision that they made. Then, group members were again separated, recorded their individual preferences, and filled out the normative and informational influence questionnaires. On completing the questionnaires, participants were debriefed and released.
RESULTS

MANIPULATION CHECKS
To ensure that the profile manipulation was successful, a series of χ 2 tests were performed using individual prediscussion prefer- ences. Under hidden profiles, we expected group members to prefer the inferior decision alternative. For the hidden profile condition, χ 2 (1) = 11.11, p < .01. Of 36 individuals provided with the hidden profile, 28 chose the inferior decision alternative, indicating that the hidden profile successfully biased initial preferences in favor of the suboptimal decision alternative.
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We expected individuals under ambiguous profiles to show no clear preference for the superior or the inferior decision alternative. For the ambiguous profile conditions, χ 2 (1) = 2.08, p = .11. Of 39 individuals provided with the ambiguous profile, 15 selected the best decision alternative and 24 selected the inferior decision alternative. The finding that this difference is not significant supports our contention that the ambiguous profile condition did not provide a clear bias for either candidate.
Finally, we anticipated that groups under clear profile conditions would initially favor the best decision alternative over the lesser decision alternative. For the clear profile conditions, χ 2 (1) = 7.11, p < .01. Of 36 individuals with a clear profile, 26 selected the best decision alternative and only 10 selected the lesser decision alternative. Again, this supports our contention that the clear profile created a bias favoring the best decision alternative.
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that groups would be most likely to make the correct decision in the clear profile groups, less likely to make the correct decision in the ambiguous profile groups, and least likely to make the correct decision in hidden profile groups. To test these predictions, we used a one-way ANOVA design using type of profile (hidden, ambiguous, or clear) as the independent variable and group decision (correct decision = 1; incorrect decision = 2) as the dependent variable. To test the hypothesis, we examined a planned contrast model that tested the linear contrast (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). We conducted a contrast analysis because it allowed us to test the specific pattern of means predicted in Hypothesis 1. A significant contrast model indicates that our hypothesis did accurately predict our findings. A Henningsen, Henningsen / NORMATIVE AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE 403 nonsignificant residual variance indicates that we did not overlook any nonhypothesized significant effects.
The linear contrast model was significant, F(1, 37) = 15.02, p < .01, η 2 = .30, whereas the residual variance was not significant, F(1, 37) = .12, p < .01, η 2 < .01. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported. Groups were most likely to select the best decision alternative under clear profiles and were least likely to do so under hidden profiles.
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that groups would perceive more normative influence in hidden and clear profile conditions than in ambiguous profile conditions. Again, a planned contrast was performed to determine whether the hypothesized quadratic effect was supported (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). Neither the contrast model, F(1, 37) = 2.75, p = .11, η 2 = .07, nor the residual variance, F(1, 37) = .09, p > .10, η 2 < .01, was significant. Therefore, we conclude that Hypothesis 2 is not supported.
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that group members would perceive more informational influence in the ambiguous profile condition than in the hidden or clear profile conditions. A planned contrast analysis of the hypothesized quadratic effect was performed to test this prediction (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations). The contrast model was significant, F(1, 37) = 3.94, p = .05, η 2 = .10, whereas the residual variance was not significant, F(1, 37) = .03, p > .10, η 2 < .01. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported. Group members perceived more informational influence under ambiguous profiles than under either of the other conditions.
We predicted in Hypothesis 4 that reliance on shared information would be highest in hidden profiles and would be reduced as groups moved to ambiguous and clear profiles. Conversely, we predicted that reliance on unshared information would steadily increase from hidden profiles to ambiguous profiles to clear profiles. A planned contrast model was designed to test the linear effects proposed in Hypothesis 4 (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations). To determine how much reliance groups placed on shared or unshared information, each group recorded the items of information they felt were most influential to their groups in making the decision. These items were coded as shared or unshared based on the distribution of information in each group. The number of items of shared and unshared information each group reported they relied on were used as a measure of that group's reliance on each type of information. Type of information (shared or unshared) is a within-group variable, and the decision condition (hidden, ambiguous, or clear profile) is a between-group variable. Overall, the contrast model was significant, F(1, 37) = 13.57, p < .01, η 2 = .26, and the residual was not significant, F(1, 37) = .09, p > .10, η 2 < .01. This supports Hypothesis 4. The reliance on shared information over unshared information in hidden profiles is reversed under clear profiles.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
To further examine the relationship between normative and informational influence in decision-making contexts, we calcu- lated the correlation between normative and informational influence. The correlation was significant and positive, r = .41, p = .01. We were also interested in exploring the overall effect that normative and informational influence had on social influence in groups. In Hypothesis 5, we predicted both normative and informational influence would positively effect changes in group members' preferences. We calculated a measure of overall influence in the decision-making groups by subtracting the number of group members expressing a preference for the best alternative after discussion from the number of group members initially expressing a preference for the best alternative in each group. Taking the absolute value of this number gives us a measure of how many group members changed positions during group discussion. This is a good indicator of the overall social influence that occurred during group discussions. We regressed this measure of social influence onto our measures of perceived normative and informational influence. The multiple regression coefficient for this regression was significant, R = .63, R 2 = .40, p < .01. Although the partial regression coefficient for normative influence was not significant, β = -.05, p > .10, the partial regression coefficient for informational influence was positive and significant, β = .65, p < .01. This indicates that the social influence that occurred in the group decisions tended to be perceived as more informational than normative and provides partial support for Hypothesis 5. 
DISCUSSION
In this study, we began with the proposition that the effect of shared information and initial starting positions are confounded in hidden profiles because both favor a suboptimal decision alternative. We proposed that groups would make significantly better decisions under ambiguous and clear profiles than under hidden profiles. Overall, we found support for this position. Groups moved from inferior to superior decisions as they moved from hidden profiles to clear profiles.
We also predicted that normative influence would be more prevalent in groups with hidden and clear profiles than in groups with ambiguous profiles. This hypothesis was not supported. No significant differences existed across conditions for perceptions of normative influence. In contrast, as hypothesized, significantly more informational influence was perceived in the ambiguous profile condition than in the hidden and clear profile conditions. This finding was consistent with our predictions.
We also found support for our hypothesis that groups' reliance on shared information was greatest in hidden profile conditions and lowest in clear profile conditions, while the reverse held true for reliance on unshared information. It appears that coupling shared starting positions with either shared or unshared information tends to increase the weight that information has in group decisions. This is consistent with Boster and Mayer's (1984) finding that arguments from majorities are perceived as stronger than arguments coming from minority positions within groups. When the prediscussion majority favors the best decision, the group members are more likely to rely on information that supports that decision (i.e., unshared information). However, when the prediscussion majority favors the inferior decision, the group members are more likely to rely on the subset of information favoring the inferior decision (i.e., shared information). Thus, the weight accorded to items of information is influenced by prediscussion support for the position that information supports.
Perhaps the most intriguing result from this study is the finding that perceptions of informational influence are a better predictor of Henningsen, Henningsen / NORMATIVE AND INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE 407 overall influence than perceptions of normative influence. This seems counter to the findings of Cruz, Henningsen, and Williams (2000) , in which normative statements had a greater influence than informational statements on individual decisions. One reason for this may be due to how Cruz et al. operationalized normative influence. Cruz et al. used recasting statements to manipulate normative influence. Recasting occurs when a group member either discounts (i.e., diminishes the importance) or bolsters (i.e., emphasizes the importance) an item of information. Thus, a person engages in recasting in a group when he or she discusses the importance (or lack thereof) of an item of information rather than simply mentioning the item. In essence, recasting reflects how group members try to influence how much weight an item of information should hold for the group decision.
As Cruz et al. (2000) noted, recasting could serve as a source of normative or informational influence. By addressing the weight that should be given a piece of information, a group member indicates the position he or she supports and thus may apply normative influence. However, inferences drawn about information are indicated when information is recast. For instance, Cruz et al. (1997) offered the following example of discounting. A group member argues that the high teaching ratings of a job candidate are more an indicator that the candidate was an easy grader than an indicator that the candidate was a good teacher. In this example, another group member may recognize the speaker opposed a specific candidate (the candidate with better evaluations). However, the other group members also may consider the claim that good teaching ratings are the result of easy grading as information relevant to the decision. Thus, recasting may be perceived as informational or normative influence.
It may also be that normative influence was reduced in the present study because we used three-member groups. Asch (1955) found a substantial increase in social influence for individuals facing a 3-to-1 majority compared to a 2-to-1 majority. It is possible that in using smaller groups, we reduced the potential for group members to successfully exert normative influence. In Cruz et al. (2000) , individuals potentially could face consistent pressure from all four members of the hypothetical group.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
How recasting is interpreted by individuals in decision-making groups presents a limitation of this study. Namely, we did not record group discussions and so we were unable to look at the relationship between statements of information, statements of preference, and recasting statements and our perceptual measures of normative and informational influence. Clearly, such data would be beneficial to a fuller understanding of normative and informational influence and is a clear direction for future research.
As it is, we feel that we have made a significant contribution to the hidden profile literature. For the first time, to our knowledge, an information distribution in which initial preferences coincided with unshared rather than shared information was examined. The creation of a clear profile offers conditions under which reliance on unshared information exceeds reliance on shared information in decision-making groups. This provides a clearer understanding of why shared information is favored in hidden profile conditions. We have found that the nature of a profile has a strong effect on (a) decisions made by group members, (b) perceptions of informational influence, and (c) reliance on shared and unshared information during group decision making.
